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Retroactivity at the Federal Circuit
DAVID L. SCHWARTZ*
A substantial subset of patent opinions from the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals functions in a wholly different manner from ordinary judicial opinions:
they have strong retroactive effects with weak prospective effects. All Federal
Circuit opinions have strong retroactive effects because issued patents and pending
applications rarely can be modified. The Federal Circuit decisions apply in full to
these patents and applications, even though they were prepared without the benefit
of the rulings. In contrast, many of these opinions have almost no prospective
effects. Patent law provides tremendous linguistic flexibility to patent drafters,
which can be used to avoid the holdings of many (but not all) opinions. Patent
drafters can freely choose any words to describe and claim the invention in the
patent application. Patentees carefully draft new applications, aware of the
decisions, to avoid their holdings. If the Federal Circuit holds that a certain phrase
necessitates a bad result, patent lawyers substitute equivalent uncontaminated
language in its place in future applications. The prospective effects of these
opinions are muted because of the linguistic flexibility in drafting applications.
Issued patents cannot be effectively modified; consequently, they are strongly
affected by Federal Circuit decisions.
There are substantial costs to the Federal Circuit’s actions. First, patent
prosecutors are excessively cautious and spend extra time drafting claims and
patent specifications to lower the risk of future changes in the law. This increases
costs while still not substantially eliminating the problem. More troubling, the
retroactive opinions weaken the incentive to innovate because the added
uncertainty in the procurement process makes patent rights insecure. It thereby
diminishes the value of patents. As their value decreases, patents cannot fully
advance technological progress, as the Constitution urges. A counterintuitive
solution—reducing the use of precedential opinions—can mitigate the retroactivity
problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Unlike other areas of law, many judicial opinions in patent law have only
retroactive—and not prospective—effects. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals,
the appellate court tasked with deciding patent appeals, has frequently startled the
patent law community with apparently run-of-the-mill rulings that substantially
alter the value of previously issued patents. These decisions often change how
lower courts must construe patent claims that have already been written, evaluate
the propriety of behavior during patent prosecution that has already occurred,
determine the validity of patents that have already issued, or assess the
infringement by products that have already been sold. Not all patent opinions fall
within this category. Some cases, such as KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,1
altered legal rules or standards in a manner which largely cannot be drafted
around.2 But an unfortunately high number do. For example, a particular style of
patent claiming, known as means-plus-function format, was historically considered
the broadest way to articulate the scope of an invention.3 In the early 1990s, the
Federal Circuit held that means-plus-function claim terms were to be construed
narrowly.4 Instantaneously, numerous issued patents became less valuable.
However, for patent applications that are filed prospectively, after the date of a
decision, educated patentees in many cases can avoid the holdings of the decision
without losing patent value. Patent attorneys can utilize tremendous flexibility
describing and claiming the invention in a patent application. Patent attorneys
routinely engage in “artful drafting” to use the right words, making the impact of
the rule change effectively nil.5 This near complete linguistic flexibility is rather

1. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
2. KSR made it easier for the courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent
Office”) to determine that a claim is obvious. Id. This sort of change cannot be overcome by
mere wordsmithing.
3. See David W. Brownlee, The Scope of Equivalents Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6
Should Vary Depending on Importance of the Means-Plus-Function Recitation to the
Invention as a Whole, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 451, 454 (1999).
4. Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg., Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
5. Others have referred to the process of patent lawyers using words previously blessed
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unique to patent law. If a Federal Circuit opinion finds particular language to be
limiting, then the attorney will substitute an effective alternative. For instance, the
Federal Circuit found that use of the phrase according to one “object of the present
invention” in a patent specification was disadvantageous.6 Thereafter, patent
attorneys replaced the disfavored language with an untainted equivalent phrase
such as “in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.”7 The ability to
easily vary the language used in patent documents effectively renders the
prospective effect of many Federal Circuit decisions as minor. However, as
mentioned above, judicial decisions can have dramatic effects on issued patents.
For these patents, most or all of the relevant activity—drafting the specification and
interacting with the U.S. Patent Office—has already occurred, and consequently is
unchangeable. In other areas of law—take zoning for example—new zoning
restrictions encumber prospective new uses of the property and cannot be evaded
by mere linguistic changes.8
The Federal Circuit rarely, if ever, mentions the retroactive effects of its
opinions. Of course, the Federal Circuit knows that some of its highly publicized
decisions have significant effects on issued patents. The Federal Circuit’s problem
is that many routine panel decisions also affect issued patents while escaping
significant attention. In fact, other courts pay substantial attention to retroactivity.
The Supreme Court and regional circuits have developed an elaborate doctrine
concerning retroactivity in other areas of law, with criminal law being most
prominent. Even when dealing with patent law, the Supreme Court appears to
conscientiously ponder potential retroactive effects of its cases.9 The holdings of
ordinary Federal Circuit decisions may be just as disruptive to the patent
community as a Supreme Court or significant en banc decision.
Retroactivity in patent law is important because patents are an integral part of
the U.S. economy. The retroactive Federal Circuit opinions have costs. They result
in excess caution by patent prosecutors who spend extra time drafting claims and
patent specifications, frequently including superfluous information to guard against
future changes in the law. More troubling from a policy perspective, the retroactive
opinions may dampen the incentive to innovate because added uncertainty in the
patent procurement process diminishes the value of patents. If patents are worth
less, they provide less enticement to inventors to create new inventions, and
encouraging the “Progress of Science and useful Arts” is the constitutionally

by the Federal Circuit as the “doctrine of the magic words.” Julie E. Cohen & Mark A.
Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9
(2001).
6. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
7. See Benjamin Hattenbach, Andrei Iancu & Kenneth Weatherwax, Patent
Prosecution Pitfalls: Perspectives from the Trenches of Litigation, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 340, 362 (2010); Jason Fischer, Patent Language: “The Present Invention”
Versus “An Embodiment of the Present Invention,” TACTICAL IP (Nov. 25, 2009, 9:30 AM),
http://tacticalip.com/2009/11/25/patent-language-the-present-invention-versus-an
-embodiment-of-the-present-invention/.
8. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1232–34 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739
(2002).
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charged purpose of the patent laws, and one which should be of primary concern to
the Federal Circuit.10
This Article examines prospectivity and retroactivity in patent law in detail.
Part I explains how prospectivity and retroactivity are more of a problem in patent
law than other areas of law. It provides numerous examples of Federal Circuit
opinions that have significantly altered the value of patents. Part II discusses why
the Federal Circuit apparently fails to adequately consider these substantial
retroactive effects. Part III considers a variety of possible solutions to the
retroactivity problem to determine what, if anything, can be done to reduce
retroactive effects.
I. RETROACTIVITY AND PROSPECTIVITY AS A
PARTICULAR PROBLEM IN PATENT LAW
This Part explains the problem of prospectivity and retroactivity in patent law in
detail. It then provides numerous Federal Circuit decisions as examples of panel
opinions which rattled patent lawyers, retroactively affecting issued patents while
permitting future patentees to completely evade all effects.
A. Why Retroactivity Is a Problem in Patent Law
Retroactivity is a potential problem in all areas of law11 and is a particular
problem in patent law. The problem, however, is not that court opinions have
retroactive effects. That is commonly true in civil litigation.12 The main problem is
that many patent opinions have only retroactive effects and no prospective effects.
1. The Minimal Prospective Effects of Decisions
Every Federal Circuit decision that clarifies or refines the patent laws has
potential effects. A substantial amount of these opinions have little if any
prospective effect, only retroactive effect. By little prospective effect, I mean that,
going forward, lawyers can simply and easily avoid the holding of opinions without
any change in future patent rights. Obviously, these opinions cause lawyers to
adjust their practices (prospectively) to avoid the opinions, but importantly there is
no prospective effect on the patent rights. This is because patent lawyers
(1) understand the current state of the law, (2) draft patent applications in view of
the current law, and (3) alter their behavior promptly after changes in the law. For
these reasons, patent lawyers can make nonsubstantive changes to an application,

10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. In the common law evolution of general tort doctrine, retroactivity has been
accepted. Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 816–18 (1983). Others have argued that retroactive application of
legal changes can be desirable. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 551 (1986).
12. Donald T. Hornstein, Resiliency, Adaptation and the Upsides of Ex Post
Lawmaking, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2011) (arguing that retroactivity is “not only
tolerated but sometimes celebrated” in some areas of law).
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thereby completely evading a Federal Circuit opinion.13 These nonsubstantive
changes do not change the original invention or meaningfully add to the public
disclosure function of patents. To be sure, by definition, precedential Federal
Circuit opinions articulate the patent doctrine. In that sense, they reflect the law and
have prospective effects. However, for the reasons just discussed, in many cases
these prospective effects rarely come to be because of lawyer behavior.
Drafting and prosecuting patent applications is a highly specialized art. The
application must comply with various statutory requirements, such as enablement,
best mode, and written description.14 Furthermore, all utility patent applications
must conclude with at least one claim, which describes the invention in words.15
Both the detailed description in the specification and the patent claims are subject
to numerous detailed and technical legal and Patent Office requirements.16 Despite
these requirements, there is enormous flexibility provided to patent applicants in all
of the words to use in their patent applications.17
From all of these methods, patent lawyers ascertain the legal changes and learn
the rules for patent prosecution.18 They understand what language to use (and not
use) in patent applications. They understand what items are required to be disclosed
to the Patent Office during patent prosecution. Therefore, patent lawyer actions
usually take into account the effects of any decision which changes the law,
provided that there was sufficient time for the decision to be processed by the
lawyer.19

13. Most routine Federal Circuit cases can be avoided prospectively by providing
careful attention to drafting the patent application. However, not all cases fall within this
category. For example, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. changed the rules so that some
patent claims became obvious. 550 U.S. 398, 419–20 (2007). Semantic changes to the claims
cannot undue or alter this effect. Similarly, the Federal Circuit’s en banc recitation of an
exclusive machine-or-transformation test in In re Bilski also excluded certain inventions
from patentable subject matter in a manner which couldn’t be evaded. 545 F.3d 943, 959–60
(Fed. Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court later found that the Federal Circuit’s test was unduly
narrow. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226–27 (2010).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
15. Id. § 112(b).
16. See generally MPEP chs. 600 & 2100 (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008) (describing
“Parts, Form, and Content of Application,” which focuses on the patent specification, and
“Patentability,” which focuses on the patent claims).
17. Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction,
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 184 (2005) (“Patentees, who are responsible for the text in
their claims, can choose words of greater or lesser generality to define their
inventions . . . .”).
18. For a discussion of patent drafting norms, see John M. Golden, Construing Patent
Claims According to Their “Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan
Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 334–45 (2008).
19. It is an interesting question whether rule-like aspects of patent law are more likely to
have retroactive-only effects, as compared to standard-like aspects of patent law. Others
have argued that, in other contexts, rules are easier to avoid prospectively. See, e.g., David
A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 860 (1999) (arguing that
the rule-oriented approach of the tax laws makes it easier for taxpayers to manipulate the
law).
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For several reasons, patent lawyers armed with knowledge of the law can
successfully ameliorate the impact of many cases.20 If certain language or
approaches are held to render a patent invalid or of narrow scope, patent lawyers
will utilize alternative language to avoid the ruling.21 Evasion is possible in part
because patent lawyers select all of the language to include in a patent application,
including all of the language used in the claims.22 So when a word or phrase is
interpreted as limiting, the attorney simply chooses another word. For instance, the
Federal Circuit may rule that claims using the phrase “adapted to receive” are
limited for some reason. In response, lawyers will select equivalent language such
as “configured to receive” or “capable of receiving” into new claims.23 And the law

20. Patent lawyers understand the law because they and their clients read the opinions
from the Federal Circuit. When they do not read the opinions themselves, they frequently
receive summaries of them through various sources including the popular Patently-O
website. PATENTLY-O, http://patentlyo.com. Law firms distribute “client updates” and there
are numerous continuing legal education programs about patent prosecution topics. For
example, Practicing Law Institute (PLI) regularly offers programs throughout the country on
patent law. See, e.g., David E. Boundy, Maximizing Patent Value by Effective Prosecution,
in ADVANCED PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP 2008: CLAIM DRAFTING & AMENDMENT
WRITING 411 (Practising Law Institute ed., 2008). Many law firms provide client case law
updates electronically. See, e.g., IP Update, Vol. 17, No. 2, February 2014, MCDERMOTT
WILL & EMERY, http://www.mwe.com/IP-Update-Vol-17-No-2-February-2014-02-26-2014/.
Patent prosecutors at law firms frequently have scheduled brown bag lunches to discuss
important changes in the law as it relates to patent prosecution.
21. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that practitioners have used the
“doctrine of the magic words” to draft claims covering software).
22. In addition to the applicable legal and Patent Office requirements, the patent lawyer
community has informally adopted various preferred manners of drafting patent applications.
The specification and claims are often prepared according to these norms of the patent
lawyer community. This is not to suggest that there is a single accepted style. The patent
prosecutor community is diverse. There is likely some variation in style and practice based
on both firm size (solo practitioner versus law firm) and perhaps the age of the patent
attorney. Patent lawyers learn these norms from others, including most notably their
colleagues. At law firms and corporations, patent lawyers are trained by more senior
attorneys in how to properly draft patent applications. Through this process, with senior
attorneys reviewing and revising draft applications provided by junior attorneys, knowledge
is easily transferred within members of the community. Bradley C. Wright & H. Wayne
Porter, Drafting the Winning Patent, in DRAFTING PATENTS FOR LITIGATION AND LICENSING
147, 200 (Bradley C. Wright ed., 2008) [hereinafter DRAFTING PATENTS] (advocating having
a second attorney review patent applications). In addition, because issued patents are public
(and, since 2000, most applications have been published as well), lawyers can read the work
product of other attorneys. Both of these reinforce the norms of patent application drafting in
the community.
23. To see the rapid rise in the use of “configured to” in patent claim language, see
Dennis Crouch, What Does It Mean for a Device to be “Configured to” Perform a
Particular Function?, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 22, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014
/01/what-does-it-mean-for-a-device-to-be-configured-to-perform-a-particular-function.html
(reporting that less than 3% of independent claims of patents issued in 1995 used
“configured to,” while over 25% of independent claims of patents issued in 2012 did).
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supports this—patentees are expressly permitted to be their own lexicographers.24
Thus, patent prosecutors can frequently avoid legal changes, as long as they can
modify the specification, the claims, and the prosecution process. The key is the
flexible linguistics permitted in patent law.25 Obviously, some high profile patent
cases such as KSR v. Teleflex changed the law in ways which cannot be avoided.26
But many, many Federal Circuit decisions are capable of being overcome by
inconsequential semantic changes.27
The brunt of the effect of these Federal Circuit decisions is therefore borne by
issued patents and then-pending applications. That is because these issued patents
and already-filed applications cannot take advantage of the evasion techniques
previously discussed.28 For these issued patents, the specification has already been
drafted and examined.29 The claims have already been drafted, frequently amended
during prosecution, and examined.30 No changes are possible.31 Patents that were
drafted and prosecuted fully compliant with the law as it then existed may be found
invalid or narrowly construed because of subsequent case law.32 This group of
patents is fully, and perhaps unfairly, subjected to the new case law, and these
patents are subject to the changes in the law.
2. The Harm Caused by Retroactivity in Patent Law
Retroactivity in patent law is important and causes many problems. It makes the
practice of law by patent attorneys (and agents) more difficult. It increases the risk
of an allegation of malpractice, as clients are upset when patents are less valuable
than expected. The retroactive effects on existing patents are more important in
many respects than the effects on future patents because investors and corporate

24. See CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
25. For an interesting discussion of linguistics as it relates to patent claim construction,
see Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61 (2007).
26. As discussed, supra note 13, KSR made it easier for the courts and Patent Office to
determine that a claim is obvious. This sort of change cannot be overcome by mere
wordsmithing.
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. See Rouget F. Henschel & Michael D. Kaminski, The State of the Law of Claim
Construction and Infringement, in DRAFTING PATENTS, supra note 22, at 1, 5 (noting that
serious errors in the specification are not correctable). Reissue and reexamination provide
some very limited relief. See infra notes 53–54.
29. See MPEP § 2163 (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008).
30. See id. § 714.
31. As discussed in more detail, infra Part II.B, reissue, in certain circumstances, allows
a patentee to modify patent claim language as long as the reissue application is filed within
two years of issuance of the patent. See also 35 U.S.C. § 251(d) (2006 & Supp. 2011).
However, reissue alone is insufficient to overcome the problems with retroactivity. The
two-year window is short relative to the duration of the patent. Furthermore, even during the
timeframe which a broadening reissue is available, no “new matter” may be added. Id. Thus,
new claim language or specification details not provided in the original application are not
permitted. Separately, continuation applications permit modified claim language, although
they are limited by the no new matter requirement.
32. In a smaller set of cases, some patents benefit from a favorable ruling.
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decision makers frequently rely upon the then-existing law in deciding whether to
finance and engage in the patenting process.33
Furthermore, patent lawyers attempt to plan ahead to cover for contingencies.34
They do so by over-drafting the specification or the claims.35 Additional
embodiments are provided or additional claims using different language are
included merely as a hedge against future law changes.36 Applications with more
claims require more time for the Patent Office to examine, further increasing costs
to the system. In addition, applicants also file continuation applications to permit
future modification of the claims.37 These costs are caused in part by the Federal
Circuit’s propensity to issue opinions with retroactive repercussions. These actions
are an attempt, only sometimes effective, at reducing the likelihood of retroactive
effects. Federal Circuit decisions arguably move the law in unexpected directions,
and lawyers have difficulty predicting these developments. These excessive costs
are inefficient to the patent system.38
Finally, the incentive to innovate may be harmed.39 The constitutional policy
behind the patent laws is that patents encourage innovation.40 Opinions with solely
retroactive effects lower the value of patents for certain investors and companies,
namely those who were unlucky enough to be on the wrong side of the rule
changes. Even though the investors and companies cannot predict whether their
patents will be affected, they understand that their patents are more probabilistic.
This, of course, adds considerable uncertainty to the patenting process, which may
discourage some innovators from seeking patent protection in the first instance.41

33. Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent
Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1304–09 (2009) (reporting empirical data showing
that patents are important to investors).
34. Hattenbach, et al., supra note 7, at 340 (“Those writing patents must recognize the
various uncertainties, embrace them, and take steps that will improve the odds of prevailing
in litigation in spite of them.”).
35. Id. at 341–42.
36. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 131–32 (2005).
37. There are many other reasons that continuation applications are filed. Retroactivity
does not alone explain the use of continuations. See, e.g., Steve Blount, The Use of Delaying
Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents and Amend Around a Patent that a Competitor Has
Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 12–13 (1999).
38. To be fair, much of the cost of patent prosecution is not due to retroactivity. Instead,
it is because of the uncertainties of claim construction, as well as the uncertainties of the
structures and functions of future developed competitive products. These uncertainties
require patent prosecutors to attempt to draft numerous claims to cover varying scope.
39. Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (2010) (stating that uncertainty in the patent system reduces
the incentives to innovate). By innovate, I mean inventing (not commercializing) things.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
41. Mullally, supra note 39, at 1112–13. However, some argue that some degree of
uncertainty may be beneficial to the patent system. Ian Ayers & Paul Klemperer, Limiting
Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of
Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 987–89 (1999).
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The consistent flow of cases with retroactive effects reduces the predictability of
patent rights.42 Thus, the upsides of patenting are lowered, which likely drops the
incentives for people to engage in activities that result in patentable inventions.
B. Potential Objections to Retroactivity and Minimal Prospectivity as a Problem
Some may object and claim that retroactivity is not a particular problem in
patent law. Their argument would be that retroactivity occurs in all areas of law and
that it is a necessary consequence of any common law system.43 More specifically,
they may assert that it occurs in real property law too.44 For the reasons that follow,
this objection is misplaced.
First, the Federal Circuit plays a central role in patent law unlike courts in other
areas of law. Because almost all appeals from patent-related matters are heard by
the Federal Circuit, its rulings are of extreme importance.45 The Federal Circuit’s
opinions are binding on all of the district courts and the Patent Office, as well as the
International Trade Commission and the United States Court of Federal Claims.46
Thus, changes in patent law have magnified effects. In contrast, real property law
decisions are traditionally matters of state law.47 Consequently, even if a state
changes its real property law with substantial effects (which I believe occurs
rarely), the effects are limited to one state. Another difference between patent law
and other property law is the frequency with which decisions with substantial
retroactive effects are issued. At its core, this is an empirical question and there is
no hard empirical data on this point. The Federal Circuit on occasion has
acknowledged that changes in patent law are frequent.48 While further analysis is

42. The effects of retroactive decisions on patentees may be evenly felt. Some would
argue that this means that the effects are inconsequential. If all patents are equally likely to
be harmed by a particular decision, then large patentees may be somewhat insulated. These
entities have extensive patent portfolios. If the Federal Circuit decisions are essentially
random, then having a large holding of patents means that some of their patents will be
affected while others will not. This would be especially true if the patents were drafted and
prosecuted by a range of lawyers and law firms, each utilizing slightly different prosecution
norms.
43. See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 12, at 1551 (arguing that retroactivity is “not only
tolerated but sometimes celebrated” in some areas of law); Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling
Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2145
(1996).
44. See Krent, supra note 43, at 2156. Patent law is quite different from real property
law in a key respect: its constitutional purpose. The Constitution authorizes the patent laws
to encourage innovation. To properly encourage innovation, the patent system must be
predictable. Patent rights must be as predictable as possible ex ante so that companies know
what innovations are patentable and how to protect them. There is no similar constitutional
purpose for real property or other laws.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2)–(4) (2006).
46. See id. § 1295(a)(2)–(6).
47. See generally Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance:
Preemption and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 293 (1993).
48. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Rader, J., concurring) (“To make my point clearer, much of the
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desirable, I believe that major changes to a state’s property laws occur less
frequently. And retroactive problems in patent law are important as patents
currently are in effect for twenty years from their filing date.49
Second, the lack of insurance for patents magnifies the effects. In the real
property arena, private insurance companies can reduce or eliminate the risks to
property holders of changes in the law. For example, title insurance can be used to
guarantee that title is clear, regardless of whether the law subsequently changes in a
way that muddies the title.50 In contrast, there is no analogous insurance for patents.
When a retroactive change in the patent laws occurs, the patent holder bears all of
the cost.
Third, self-help is possible in other areas of law. Moving beyond real property
law, consider contract law. Take a court, for example, which rules that a particular
clause is to be given a meaning that was not anticipated by the parties. Even if there
are many contracting parties outside the litigation who used the identical language,
they are permitted to renegotiate. Thus, a party relying upon a form contract with
all vendors can approach the vendors and amend the contract, even in the event a
court rules that certain language was problematic. Renegotiation allows the parties
to recalibrate the deal to correspond to any legal change. To be fair, renegotiation
may not always occur, even in contract law. Parties may be difficult to locate, or
they may not wish to renegotiate (or may insist upon a high price to alter the
contract). But renegotiation is an option. In patent law, the patent cannot be
renegotiated in the same way. Once a patent has issued, with the limited exception
of reissue or reexamination, which is addressed immediately below, it cannot be
altered.
Another objection is that patentees draft multiple claims to overcome future
legal challenges. To be sure, patentees often draft claims of varying breadth, with
some broader claims being closer to the known line on validity.51 Patents contain
narrower claims, which may be much more likely to survive a litigation validity
challenge, but also cover far fewer products. The objection is that the practice of
utilizing multiple claims obviates much of the risk of retroactive legal changes. To
be fair, the practice of permitting multiple patent claims does mean that
retroactivity need not be an all-or-nothing situation. Sometimes only a subset of
claims are affected (either in terms of validity or potential scope for infringement),
which means that the incentives to innovate are dampened but not eliminated. I
argue, though, that many of these Federal Circuit decisions are unpredictable
unpredictability of these changes lies in the pace of change. By common law standards, this
court’s jurisprudence moves at a lightning pace. This pace can engender uncertainty about
the consequences of each new rule.”).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
50. James Bruce Davis, More Than They Bargained For: Are Title Insurance
Companies Liable in Tort for Undisclosed Title Defects?, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 71, 71 (1995)
(“Title insurance has become the prevailing method by which real estate purchasers and
mortgage lenders protect themselves against the risk of defects in their titles.”).
51. See Edward V. Filardi & Mark D. Baker, The Past, Present & Future of the Federal
Circuit: Practitioner Perspectives on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, Claim Construction,
and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 840 (2004) (“Moreover, the
need to file narrowing amendments might be avoided if the application includes many
independent claims of varying breadth—that is, claims over the entire spectrum.”).
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enough that multiple claims are ineffective. If the law changes in an unexpected
direction, lawyers will not have drafted claims in the new, preferred format.
Yet another potential objection is that there are the administrative procedures of
reissue and reexamination to aid patentees in the event of changes in the law.52 In
most circumstances, the administrative procedures of reissue53 and reexamination54
will be nearly useless to patentees. First, reexaminations cannot broaden patent
claims.55 Consequently, any judicial decision which narrows patent claims and their
construction cannot be fixed through reexamination. Reissues may be of use in this
regard, but they can only broaden patent claims if filed within two years of the
issuance of the patent.56 For decisions with retroactive effects beyond those two
years, broadening reissues are unavailable. Even within those two years in which
broadening reissue is possible, the range of possible changes is confined. This is
because of the “new matter” doctrine which prohibits patentees from adding any
new matter to the patent application after the filing date.57 Broadening is also
cabined by the enablement and written description requirements.58 The
specification must enable and provide a proper written description for any
broadened claims as of the filing date of the application (not the filing date of the
reissue), which cannot be expanded with any new matter.59 Finally, reexamination
and reissue cannot be used to remedy defects with the specification, even if the
specification was compliant with the existing law at the time of drafting. The new
matter doctrine will prohibit any change that includes new matter.60 For these
reasons, almost all of the exemplary retroactive cases provided in this Article
cannot be overcome via reexamination or reissue.
Finally, even if a similar problem exists in other areas of law, that alone does not
diminish its significance to patent law. Instead it means that patent law is on similar
footing as other areas of law. But, again, I submit that the problem is more
pronounced in patent law. Moreover, few areas of law have the anomaly that patent
law has: weak prospective effects with large retroactive ones. Most other areas of
law have stronger prospective effects.

52. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251, 302–07 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
53. Reissue permits the Patent Office to review an issued patent, in this case if the
inventor or assignee can show some error.
54. Reexamination permits the Patent Office to reconsider an issued patent if there is a
substantial new question of patentability. The patent claims can be confirmed as is, or they
can be narrowed.
55. 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2006) (“No proposed amended or new claim enlarging the scope of
a claim of the patent will be permitted in a reexamination proceeding . . . .”).
56. Id. § 251(d) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (“No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging
the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the
grant of the original patent.”).
57. Id. § 132(b) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention.”).
58. See id. § 112(a).
59. See id. § 132.
60. It is also unclear whether semantic changes of wording of the specification, even if
accepted by the Patent Office, are to be given significant weight by the courts.
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C. Examples of Federal Circuit Decisions
There are legions of opinions with substantial retroactive effects and little
prospective effects. These decisions can be broadly categorized as those affecting
the preparation of the patent specification, those affecting claim drafting, and those
affecting prosecution of the patent application before the Patent Office. These
categories are described in more detail below, along with exemplary cases. These
cases are some of the clearest instances of retroactivity in regular Federal Circuit
decision making. The list below is not exhaustive; other cases exist which further
illustrate the point.
1. Retroactive Changes to Claims and Infringement
All utility patents end with at least one claim.61 The claim recites, in precise
technical terms, the scope of the patentee’s exclusive rights.62 The scope of the
claim is a central issue when evaluating the critical issues of patentability before
the Patent Office or validity or infringement in patent litigation. Because of the
well-known importance of patent claims, patent prosecutors spend substantial time
considering the exact language of the claims.63 The Patent Office also focuses a
large portion of the examination of applications on the claims.64
Several aspects of the law relating to patent claims have been changed over
time.65 The first example involves means-plus-function claim language.
Means-plus-function claim language is expressly authorized in the Patent Act at
§ 112(f).66 This type of claim language permits an applicant to avoid reciting a

61. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(a) (2013).
62. Jonathan L. Moore, A Patent Panacea?: The Promise of Corbinized Claim
Construction, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 7 (2010) (“[C]laims define a patent’s scope
and thus the subject matter over which the patentee can claim a monopoly.”).
63. Legendary Federal Circuit Judge Giles Rich stated, “[T]he name of the game is the
claim.” Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) (emphasis
omitted). For additional discussion on claim drafting, see generally ROBERT C. FABER, FABER
ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (6th ed. 2010) .
64. See Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 179, 182–84 (2007).
65. In addition to the Federal Circuit, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
also made various changes to patent law, some of which had retroactive effects. For
example, in 1970, the CCPA eliminated the Patent Office’s ability to reject claims due to
“undue breadth” without having to provide a more detailed rationale. In re Application of
Mayhew, 527 F.2d 1229, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Baldwin, J., concurring); see also Jeffrey A.
Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the
Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 860 (2010)
(discussing how the CCPA “banished” the doctrine of undue claim breadth).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (“An element in a claim for a combination
may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.”).
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specific structural limitation in the claim. Instead, the applicant can recite a
function. These claim elements cover structures to perform the claimed function.
To accomplish this, the applicant typically uses the term “means” in the claim. In
the early days of the Federal Circuit, means-plus-function claims (both literally and
under the doctrine of equivalents) were interpreted broadly.67 They were afforded
scope over a wide range of structures which performed the recited function.68 It was
not limited to structures recited in the claim or the specification.69 Accordingly,
means-plus-function claim language was favored by many patent lawyers and
clients as a way to obtain broad patent protection.70
The scope of means-plus-function claims was radically adjusted in 1993 in
Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing Co.71 In Valmont Industries, the
Federal Circuit stated that if an applicant elected to use means-plus-function
language, a certain “string attached.”72 The Federal Circuit held that the process to
construe means-plus-function claim language required locating the precise function
from the specification.73 From there, the specification again must be consulted to
learn the precise structures, materials, or acts described to perform the function.74
Finally, equivalents to these structures, materials, or acts are allowed only if they
are structural equivalents and perform the same function.75 With such a narrow
definition of equivalents, the scope of means-plus-function claim limitations
became substantially narrowed.
This holding reversed the previously held interpretation of means-plus-function
claims.76 After Valmont Industries, means-plus-function claims were limited to the
embodiments specifically disclosed in the specification, and the narrowly construed
“equivalents thereof.” Thus, means-plus-function claim limitations were frequently

67. John F. Triggs, Functional Claiming: § 112 ¶ 6 Still Difficult After All These Years,
LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 31, 31 (“Section 112 ¶ 6 was enacted to allow patent
prosecutors an additional, broader way to claim an invention.”); see also Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1946) (explaining the doctrine of
equivalents).
68. See Evan Finkel, Means-Plus-Function Claims in Light of Donaldson and Other
Recent Case Developments, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 267, 268–69
(1994).
69. Brownlee, supra note 3, at 454.
70. George F. Wheeler, Creative Claim Drafting: Claim Drafting Strategies,
Specification Preparation, and Prosecution Tactics, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
34, 40 (2003) (“At the beginning of my career, I was taught to use means-plus-function
language as a way to expand the literal words used in the claim . . . .”); Triggs, supra note
67, at 31 (“For years it had been common practice to include at least one functional claim in
an apparatus application, in part because it was thought to be a much broader way to claim
an invention.”).
71. 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
72. Id. at 1042.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1044.
76. See Wheeler, supra note 70, at 40–42; Triggs, supra note 67, at 31 (“But over the
last 15 years, the way courts have identified and treated such § 112 ¶ 6 functional claims has
evolved as a way to limit the patent rights.”).
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interpreted vary narrowly: limited to nearly the exact structure disclosed by the
patentee.77 In contrast, regular claim language is interpreted as it is understood by
those of skill in the art.78 In most cases, non-means-plus-function claim language is
broader. Consequently, patent lawyers after Valmont Industries, and indeed even
today, are very reticent to exclusively rely on means-plus-function claim
language.79
Valmont Industries represented an enormous shift in the law. Until 1993,
educated patent lawyers may have preferred means-plus-function claim language
because it was viewed as broader than regular claim language.80 After 1993,
means-plus-function claim language was nearly always narrower than standard
claim language.81 Means-plus-function claim language became disfavored, and the
number of issued patents using means-plus-function language dropped from nearly
fifty percent in the early 1990s to under ten percent in 2010.82 When it was used, it
was included in extra patent claims—a belt-and-suspenders approach.83 Because
patent lawyers can draft claim language using either approach, the change in the
law was very significant. Numerous patents have been held not infringed because
of this change in the law.84
Shortly thereafter, the Federal Circuit affirmed the holding of Valmont
Industries relating to means-plus-function claim language in In re Donaldson.85

77. Scott G. Ulbrich, Festo, Notice and the Application of Prosecution History Estoppel
to Means-Plus-Function Claim Limitations, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1165, 1167 (2002)
(“Means-plus-function claim limitations may evade the notice principles because the scope
of means-plus-function claim limitations encompasses a range of equivalents as a matter of
law. Presumably, means-plus-function claim limitations include equivalents even when
equivalents would not be otherwise available because of estoppel.”).
78. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
79. Wheeler, supra note 70, at 40–42. However, there may be other reasons to utilize
means-plus-function claim language. For example, it may be more difficult to understand,
which may be of some benefit in litigation. See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 239, 242
(2005) (reporting that the Federal Circuit reversed 39.3% of appeals of means-plus-function
claim limitations and 34.5% of appeals of all claim terms from 1996 to 2003).
80. See JOSEPH E. ROOT, RULES OF PATENT DRAFTING: GUIDELINES FROM FEDERAL
CIRCUIT CASE LAW 339 (2011) (noting the different expectations of patent drafters before
Valmont Industries); Wheeler, supra note 70, at 40–41.
81. STEPHAN A. BECKER, PATENT APPLICATIONS HANDBOOK § 2:10 (2007).
82. See Dennis Crouch, The Frequency of Means-Plus-Function Claims, PATENTLY-O
(July 25, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/07/the-frequency-of-means-plus
-function-claims.html.
83. Id.; Wright & Porter, supra note 22, at 102 (noting that one should avoid relying
exclusively on means-plus-function claim language).
84. As but one example, the famous litigant Ronald Katz recently lost a major
multi-district litigation based in part on narrow claim constructions of means-plus-function
claims. In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1315–16
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
85. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). Donaldson was decided by an en banc
Federal Circuit, which makes it different from the other “routine” Federal Circuit decisions
discussed in Part II.C. However, Donaldson was decided in 1994, before the current
attention provided to en banc patent cases at the Federal Circuit. Indeed, I was not able to
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The narrower claim construction provided in Donaldson was surprising because the
case involved an administrative appeal of a denial of a patent from the Patent
Office. The Patent Office typically construes claims broader than the courts under
its broadest reasonable interpretation standard, which is in contrast to the narrow
construction given to means-plus-function elements.86
Another significant change occurred87 with respect to the law of joint
infringement. In BMC Resources v. Paymentech,88 the patents-in-suit related to
methods of processing debt transactions without a personal identification number. All
of BMC’s claims at issue were fashioned as method claims. In all of the claims, no
single actor performed all of the steps. Instead, several different actors, including a
payee’s agent, a remote payment network, and the card-issued financial institution,
each performed some of the steps, and together performed all of the steps.89
After acknowledging that the district court found no case law on point, the
Federal Circuit set forth the law.90 It held that for method claims, infringement
required that a single entity perform all of the steps.91 Based upon the decision in
BMC Resources,92 no entity performed all of the steps of any of the asserted claims,
and consequently, the district court’s finding of non-infringement was affirmed.93
The Federal Circuit recently revised the law of joint infringement en banc,
overruling BMC Resources.94
locate even a single amicus brief filed in Donaldson.
86. Dawn-Marie Bey & Christopher Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent
Office’s “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 285, 287–88
(2009) (discussing the difference in claim construction between the Patent Office and the
courts); see also, MPEP § 2111 (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008).
87. Yet another, more limited example occurred in Sun Pharmaceutical Industries v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Federal Circuit found the patent-in-suit,
which was directed to a method of use, invalid under an obscure doctrine known as
obvious-type double patenting. Id. at 1389. While the underlying facts are slightly confusing
in the case, the Federal Circuit held invalid a patent claiming a use of a drug because the
same use of the drug was disclosed in an unrelated drug patent held by the same patentee. Id.
This ruling can be easily overcome so that there are no prospective effects. To overcome the
decision, a patentee should include a claim directed to the method of use in the drug patent.
If the Patent Office issues a restriction requirement, then there can be no double patenting. If
there is no restriction requirement, then a terminal disclaimer will be effective to eliminate a
double patenting problem.
88. 498 F.3d. 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
89. Id. at 1375.
90. Id. at 1378–79.
91. Id. at 1380. This rule is not self-evident. In fact, the Federal Circuit has held that the
same one-actor rule does not apply to system claims. Components owned by separate
entities, even those components located outside the United States, may be sufficient for
infringement of system claims. See Centillion Data Sys. v. Qwest Commc’ns, 631 F.3d 1279
(Fed. Cir. 2011); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
92. In BMC Resources, the Federal Circuit stated that parties could not merely contract
out of performing certain steps in a claim. BMC Resources, 498 F.3d. at 1381. However,
subsequent case law has narrowed this exception. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.,
532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
93. BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1382.
94. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 11 (Jan. 10, 2014).
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What is interesting about BMC Resources is that the Federal Circuit expressly
recognized that the effects of its ruling could be avoided by different claim
drafting.95 It noted that BMC could have drafted its method claims using language
that a single entity would perform.96 For example, take the claimed step of “the
accessed remote payment network determining . . . whether sufficient available
credit or funds exist . . . to complete the payment transaction.”97 As drafted, the
“assessed payment network,” which may be an ATM, must perform this step. The
language could be redrafted to read “receiving sufficient fund information from the
assessed remote payment network, the sufficient fund information indicating
whether sufficient available credit or funds exist . . . to complete the payment
transaction.” It should be noted that the difference in the claim language is
completely semantic; there is no substantive difference. After BMC, lawyers knew
to draft claims using language that a single entity would infringe.
In 2012, the Federal Circuit revised the law of joint infringement again, this time
en banc. In Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., the court
reaffirmed that proof of direct infringement required that a single entity perform all
of the claimed steps.98 However, a bare majority of the Federal Circuit found that
indirect infringement did not require a single entity to perform all of the steps of a
claimed invention.99 The en banc decision on divided infringement has added
uncertainty to claim drafting in the area.100 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in 2014, compounding the uncertainty.
A final example of a case with retroactive effects on claim drafting is In re
Beauregard.101 Beauregard involved an appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences’s rejection of a particular style of software claim.102 The claim at
issue in Beauregard was directed to a computer readable medium (such as a CD or
floppy disk) containing a set of instructions that causes a computer to perform a
process.103 The Federal Circuit vacated the Board of Patent Appeals decision and
authorized claims in this general format.104 This was important because before
Beauregard, claims with instructions were generally considered not patentable
because they were viewed as violating the “printed matter” doctrine.105 Thereafter,

95. BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1381 (citing Mark A. Lemley, David O’Brien, Ryan
M. Kent, Ashok Ramani & Robert Van Nest, Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J.
255, 272–75 (2005)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1377.
98. 692 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 2014
U.S. LEXIS 11 (Jan. 10, 2014).
99. Id. at 1307–11.
100. It should be noted that a large number of the affected claims were business methods.
It is tempting to speculate that the BMC Resources opinion was part of the Federal Circuit’s
goal of reducing the effects and reach of business methods.
101. 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1584.
104. Id.
105. See Stephen A. Becker, Note, Drafting Patent Applications on
Computer-Implemented Inventions, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 247 (1991); Anthony L.
Miele & Bruce H. Bernstein, Drafting Claims for Patent Prosecution of
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claims of this format became widely adopted and are commonly referred to as
Beauregard claims.106
Beauregard is significant because it shows that sometimes a Federal Circuit
decision positively affects issued patents. Putting aside the prospective effects of
the Beauregard decision,107 the decision also had retroactive effects. For the small
number of patentees who used Beauregard claims, their patents were worth more to
the market.108 Issued patents that used other formats remained of questionable
validity. Not only was there more certainty prospectively, some issued patents
increased in value while others merely remained constant.109
In 2011, in CyberSource v. Retail Decisions, the Federal Circuit appears to have
implicitly changed course on Beauregard claims, ruling that a claim written in that
format was not patentable subject matter.110 While patentees have relied upon the
Beauregard opinion for guidance for over fifteen years, the rules may have
changed. As for prospectivity, there is no clear avenue for patentees to use to avoid
CyberSource. As for retroactivity, the repercussions of this recent case may be
severe for issued patents. One commentator has noted that over 40,000 issued
patents contain at least one Beauregard claim.111 The Federal Circuit’s en banc
Software/Computer-Related Inventions in the U.S. in Order to Maximize the Scope of
Protection, 1 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 41, 57 (1992); Robert Greene Sterne, Edward J.
Kessler, Robert R. Axenfield, Michael Q. Lee & Robert E. Sokohl, Preparing and
Prosecuting Electronic and Computer Related Patent Applications: Avoiding and
Overcoming Statutory Subject Matter Rejections, 33 IDEA 297, 310–19 (1993); see also In
re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
106. See, e.g., Andrei Iancu & Jeremiah Helm, Code on Disks and Hat Tricks—Is
Computer Software on a Medium Really Patentable?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
97 (2008); Shawn McDonald, Patenting Floppy Disks, or How the Federal Circuit’s
Acquiescence Has Filled the Void Left by Legislative Inaction, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 9 (1998);
Elizabeth A. Richardson, Toward a Direct Functional Relationship Requirement for Claims
to Software Encoded on a Computer-Readable Storage Medium: Rethinking In re
Beauregard in Response to the USPTO’s Interim Guidelines Regarding the Patentability of
Data Signal Claims, 3 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 30 (2006).
107. Subsequent to the decision, patent lawyers began including Beauregard claims in
software patent applications. The Patent Office readily accepted this claim format. See
Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (Feb. 28,
1996); MPEP § 2106 (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008). Thus, unlike the other decisions discussed
in Part II.C, the Beauregard decision had substantive prospective effects.
108. It is impossible to assess the subjective value to the patentee, although it appears
unlikely that patentees can repeatedly and accurately predict future Federal Circuit case law.
109. Similarly, even patentable subject matter cases are capable of prospective
avoidance. See Kristel Schorr & Jackie Wright Bonilla, Top Twelve Practice Tips Following
Myriad and Prometheus, PERSONALIZED MED. BULLETIN, http://www.personalized
medicinebulletin.com/diagnostic-methods/top-twelve-practice-tips-following-myriad-and
-prometheus/ (describing ways to draft claims to avoid the holding of Ass’n Molecular
Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), affirmed in part, rev’d in part, 133
S. Ct. 2107 (2013)).
110. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373, 1376–77 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
111. James G. McEwen & Ramya Possett, The Broadening Chasm Between Claim
Interpretation During Litigation and Examination for Product-By-Process Claims,
LANDSLIDE, Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 19 (“Currently, at least 41,334 issued patents contain at least
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ruling in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. did little to clarify the legal
landscape relating to software.112 Disappointingly, while some of the claims at
issue were ultimately found invalid, the CLS Bank case did not generate a majority
opinion that explained when, if ever, software can be patentable. The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the CLS Bank case, and the Court is expected to issue a
decision by June 2014. The uncertainty, especially for issued patents, is quite high.
But it is worth noting that opinions which retroactively strengthen patents by
definition harm potential infringers. When a product is manufactured and sold, it
may not infringe a valid claim of a patent. However, subsequent case law may
change the possibility of liability. Potential infringers can modify their behavior
prospectively, but cannot undo items already made, used, sold, or imported. This is
the mirror image of the effects on patentees when patent value increases.
2. Retroactive Changes to the Patent Specification
As a brief explanation for those less familiar with patent law, the specification of a
patent contains various standard sections, such as Background of the Invention,
Summary of the Invention, Brief Description of the Figures, and Detailed Description
of the Invention.113 Patent prosecutors draft text for each section, largely from scratch
for each invention. While the precise language is tailored to the invention at issue,
there are certain norms and practices within the patent prosecutor community.114
Prosecutors often use similar sentence structure or organizational schemes.115 General
purpose phrases like “in accordance with one embodiment of the invention” or “an
object of the invention is” are used and reused by patent lawyers.116 These words are
understood by patent lawyers to have certain meanings and are often included in
widely read handbooks on patent prosecution.117 Occasionally, the Federal Circuit
shifts the legal effect of these words.
The effects of reciting various “Objects of the Invention” were redefined in
Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.118 In Gentry Gallery, the patent-in-suit was
directed to sofas, and more particularly to sectional sofas with two independent
reclining seats.119 The claims required two reclining seats, a console between the
two reclining seats, and a pair of control means.120 The originally filed claims had a
one Beauregard claim.”).
112. 717 F.3d 1269 (2013) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013).
113. MPEP § 608 (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008).
114. There are numerous annual conferences devoted solely to patent prosecution; for
example, the PLI Patent Prosecution Workshops result in a yearly publication. See, e.g.,
Advanced Patent Prosecution Workshop 2014: Claim Drafting & Amendment Writing,
PRACTISING LAW INST. (July 2014), http://www.pli.edu/Content/CourseHandbook/Advanced
_Patent_Prosecution_Workshop_2014/_/N-4mZ1z12ex2?ID=179644.
115. Hattenbach et al., supra note 7, at 362.
116. See Lin Shao, How to Draft a Patent, TEX. A&M UNIV., http://beamlab.tamu.edu
/Writting%20Tips/Dr.%20Shao/How%20to%20draft%20a%20patent.html.
117. See, e.g., FRED K. CARR, PATENTS HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR INVENTORS AND
RESEARCHERS TO SEARCHING PATENT DOCUMENTS AND PREPARING AND MAKING AN
APPLICATION 42 (2009).
118. 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
119. Id. at 1474–75.
120. Id.

2014]

RETROACTIVITY AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

1565

further limitation that the control means be located on the console.121 During
prosecution, that limitation was removed.122 In its place, the claims were amended
to recite that the control means be “mounted on the double reclining seat sofa
section.”123
In 1998, the Federal Circuit found that the patent-in-suit was invalid for failure
to comply with the written description requirement.124 The written description
argument focused on the location of controls on the sofas.125 The Federal Circuit
ruled that the specification required that the control means be located on the
console.126 Consequently, the Federal Circuit found that the issued claims, which
omitted this limitation, were too broad and failed 35 U.S.C. § 112.127 To reach this
decision, the Federal Circuit heavily relied upon certain words used in the
specification of the patent-in-suit.128
The Federal Circuit noted that in the background section of the specification of
the patent-in-suit that the patentee used the phrase “object of the invention” several
times.129 For example, the patent cites that the patentee disclosed that an object of
the invention is to provide a sectional sofa “with a console . . . that accommodates
the controls for both the reclining seats.”130 The patent also states that “[a]nother
object of the present invention is to provide . . . a console positioned between [the
reclining seats] that accommodates the controls.”131 Relying upon these statements
as limiting the invention, the Federal Circuit found that the deviation from the
“objects” was beyond what the patentee was entitled.132
Prior to the Gentry Gallery decision, it was standard practice for patent
prosecutors to recite “Objects of the Invention.”133 Each conceivable purpose of the
invention was recited as a separate object. It was not understood that if a single

121. Id. at 1475.
122. Id. at 1477.
123. Id. at 1475.
124. Id. at 1479.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1479–80.
127. Id. at 1479.
128. See id. at 1478–79.
129. Id. at 1479.
130. Id. at 1478.
131. Id. at 1479.
132. Id. at 1479–80. Several cases subsequent to Gentry Gallery reinforced the view that
use of the word “invention” in a specification can be problematic. See Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (relying upon the word
“invention” in the specification to limit the scope of the claims); Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232
F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (importing limitations from the specification into the claims
because the patentee used the term “invention”); Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199
F.3d 1295, 1301–02 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (limiting patent claim because applicant used language
focusing on the advantage of the invention); Boundy, supra note 20, at 433 (citing cases to
argue against use of the word “invention” in a patent specification).
133. Wright & Porter, supra note 22, at 56 (“It has been the practice of many patent
attorneys to refer to various ‘objects of the invention’ or ‘advantages of the invention’ when
summarizing and describing the invention’s principles in a patent application. Many
thousands if not millions of U.S. patents have issued with language similar to this . . . .”).
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object were missing from a claim, then the claimed invention was invalid. In fact, it
was just the opposite—it was thought that the claims exclusively defined the scope
of the invention, and that the objects provided background but not limiting
information.134
After the Gentry Gallery decision, prosecutors changed their practice.135 The
Patent Office had never required an applicant to recite “Objects of the Invention.”
Since they were not required, and they had the potential—as evidenced by Gentry
Gallery—to cause problems, many prosecutors were advised to omit them.136
Consequently, relatively quickly after the decision, the standard practice of
prosecutors moved from including “Objects of the Invention” to being silent on the
objects of the invention.137 The effect of Gentry Gallery was to reduce disclosure in
specifications for applications filed after the case was decided.138 And by removing
any reference to “Objects of the Invention,” Gentry Gallery had little effect on new
patent applications. Also, in Gentry Gallery, the Federal Circuit relied upon the fact
that the patent recited that a particular aspect of the disclosure was “essential.”139
Again, the prospective solution for patent prosecutors was less disclosure to
overcome the case law. It is now considered bad practice to use words like
“important” or “essential” in a patent specification.140
The effect was quite different on issued patents and applications that had already
been filed as of the decision date. Many of those patents and applications included
a recitation of the “Objects of the Invention.”141 They were bound by the decision,
and now are susceptible to a written description validity challenge. Patents drafted
and issued in the 1980s, or earlier, were weakened (because new defenses were
available) by the 1998 Federal Circuit decision. Even if the application was still
merely pending before the Patent Office, the specification was set as of the filing
date, and could not be amended to include any new matter.142 To be fair, few
patents have been invalidated subsequent to Gentry Gallery on this basis in

134. Id.
135. Wheeler, supra note 70, at 44 (suggesting “leaving out a recitation of ‘objects of the
invention’” because of Gentry Gallery and other cases).
136. Id.
137. Cynthia M. Lambert, Gentry Gallery and the Written Description Requirement, 71
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 109, 138–39 (2001); Cindy I. Liu, Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline
Corp., 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123, 134 (1999).
138. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J.
779, 804–05 (2011) (arguing that some Federal Circuit opinions have increased the incentive
for applicants to disclose less information).
139. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
140. Richard V. Burgujian, Esther H. Lim, Wenye Tan & Ningling Wang, Practical
Considerations and Strategies in Drafting U.S. Patent Applications, FINNEGAN.COM,
Apr. 2009, at 2–3, http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/ (search “Last Name” for
“Burgujian” then follow article hyperlink); Boundy, supra note 20, at 433 (identifying
various “words to avoid” in patent applications including the following: best, crucial,
essential, highly, key, most, radically, unique); ROOT, supra note 80, at 153 (discouraging
patent applicants from characterizing aspects of the invention as “essential” in light of
Gentry Gallery).
141. See Liu, supra note 137, at 134.
142. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006).
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litigation.143 However, most cases settle, and a new defense is available that was
not available beforehand.
There are other cases beyond Gentry Gallery that had similar effects on
specification drafting. For example, in Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Technologies
Corp., the Federal Circuit changed the level of detail required to satisfy the
definiteness requirement of patent law.144 In general, to comply with the
definiteness requirement, all that is required is that a person of skill in the art could
ascertain the meaning in light of the specification.145 The knowledge of a person of
skill in the art could complete the details.146 In Biomedino, the Federal Circuit held
that a different rule applied to means-plus-function claims.147 It affirmed a finding
that certain claims that used means-plus-function claim format were invalid as
indefinite.148 The patentee had used the phrase “control means” in the claims,
which the court found to be in means-plus-function format.149 The patent-in-suit
had included some disclosure of the control means in the specification.150 It
included a box in one of the drawings which was labeled as “control.”151 The patent
also included a statement that the process may be “controlled automatically by
known differential pressure, valving and control equipment.”152 The Federal Circuit
stated that the knowledge of one of skill in the art could not be used to satisfy the
definiteness requirement.153 According to the Federal Circuit, some specific
structure needed to be disclosed by the patentee.154
Subsequent to Biomedino, applicants include more detailed descriptions in the
specifications. These descriptions include basic structures if they relate to meansplus-function claim elements.155 Consequently, there is little or no prospective
effect of the decision. However, for specifications drafted before Biomedino, an
indefiniteness challenge is now possible.
The Federal Circuit has also limited the use of the knowledge of a person of
ordinary skill in the art in other contexts. For instance, the Federal Circuit recently
ruled that the knowledge of a person of skill in the art cannot complete missing
information in the specification needed for the enablement requirement.156 In short,

143. This is perhaps due to another form of uncertainty caused by the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit formally follows stare decisis, but it often distinguishes cases to their
facts. Gentry Gallery may have been a case so limited.
144. 490 F.3d 946 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
145. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
146. See Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
147. Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 952–53.
148. Id. at 953.
149. Id. at 950.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 952.
154. Id.
155. Later Federal Circuit opinions affirmed and relied upon Biomedino. See Telecordia
Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
156. ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharma., L.L.C., 603 F.3d 935, 940–41 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(stating that an applicant “cannot simply rely on the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill
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the Federal Circuit has changed the law on how much detail is required in a patent
specification.157 The effects of this change are nearly entirely retroactive, not
prospective.158
3. Retroactive Changes to Prosecution Before the Patent Office
The Patent Office substantively examines patent applications.159 Examination is
accomplished by the exchange of various papers between the applicant and the
Patent Office. These papers include, for example, the original patent application,
office actions reflecting arguments by the Patent Office that some of the patent
claims are unpatentable for one reason or another, applicant responses to office
actions, and prior art to the invention.160
The applicants, their attorneys, and others substantively involved in the patent
prosecution process owe the Patent Office a duty of candor and good faith.161 The
duty of candor and good faith contains the requirement to provide to the Patent
Office information material to the patentability of the invention.162 Material
information includes prior art of which the applicants or their attorneys are
aware.163 The courts have recognized the defense of “inequitable conduct” if a
patentee fails to abide by these duties.164 If a court finds that a patentee engaged in
inequitable conduct, the penalty is stiff: the patent as a whole may be declared
unenforceable, and attorneys’ fees from the litigation may be assessed against the
patentee.165 The patentee may also be ordered to pay the attorneys’ fees of the
accused infringer.166 At least before Therasense, inequitable conduct was
reportedly alleged in a majority of patent infringement cases.167 Of the interactions
to serve as a substitute for the missing information in the specification”).
157. See Holbrook, supra note 138, at 779 (arguing that the Federal Circuit has recently
“marginalized” the role of a person of skill in the art in its § 112 analysis).
158. This is quite different from a Securities and Exchange Commission change in how
much disclosure is required in initial public offering (IPO) documents, for example. There
would be only a relatively small number of pending IPOs with defective documentation, and
all of it could be fixed. The change would not matter for past IPOs. In contrast, defective
patents—which may include any patent still in force—are unfixable.
159. See MPEP ch. 2103 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012).
160. Id. ch. 601.
161. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2013) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution
of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office . . . .”).
162. Id.
163. Id. (noting that the duty of candor and good faith “includes a duty to disclose to the
Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in
this section”).
164. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc); Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723 (2009).
165. Cf. Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and
Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2011)
(arguing that no doctrine in patent law is more important than inequitable conduct).
166. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289.
167. Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1360 (2009) (citing one study where
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with the Patent Office during prosecution of an application, the duty to disclose
information is paramount.
The requirements of the duty to disclose information to the Patent Office were
heightened in McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc.168 In
McKesson, the patent-in-suit was directed to a “patient identification system for
relating items with patients and ensuring that an identified item corresponds to an
identified patient.”169 In 2007, the Federal Circuit affirmed a holding that the
patent-in-suit was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.170
While prosecuting the patent-in-suit, the patent attorney also prosecuted another
patent application for the patentee.171 These patent applications were not “related”
as that term is used by patent lawyers: they were not a continuation, divisional, or
continuation-in-part of the patent-in-suit.172 However, they were directed to roughly
the same technology.173 These applications were assigned to a different patent
examiner.174
Before McKesson, most patent prosecutors did not disclose office actions to the
Patent Office.175 The conventional wisdom was that office actions were merely
arguments about why particular claims were not patentable.176 The potentially
material information was found in the prior art itself, not the office actions. The
Patent Office also issued the office action so it seemed somewhat circular to
disclose government correspondence to the government. Consequently, patent
prosecutors felt that disclosing the prior art but not the office action fully complied
with their duty of disclosure.
After McKesson, the disclosure norms changed. Because the Federal Circuit had
ruled that failure to disclosure an office action could be material, prosecutors began
to disclose office actions.177 No doubt there are some logistical issues for repeat
patent filers in confirming that office actions in every case are continually provided
nearly sixty percent of district court cases include allegations of inequitable conduct). There
is little firm data from after the Therasense decision, and some have criticized the Mammen
study. See Jason Rantanen, Recalibrating Our Empirical Understanding of Inequitable
Conduct, 3 IP THEORY 98 (2013).
168. 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
169. Id. at 902.
170. Id. at 926.
171. Id. at 904.
172. Continuations, divisionals, and continuations-in-part applications are types of patent
applications which rely, at least in part, upon the disclosure and filing date of a previously
filed patent application. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
173. McKesson, 487 F.3d at 904.
174. Id.
175. The Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc. decision of 2003 arguably was
the first case to require disclosure to the Patent Office of information about related cases.
329 F.3d 1358, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Dayco and McKesson alone or together
substantially changed the duties of patent prosecutors. ROOT, supra note 80, at 433 (arguing
that these two decisions “have markedly increased the attorney’s responsibility for providing
information to the PTO”).
176. Lisa A. Dolak, The Inequitable Conduct Gyre Widens, 50 IDEA 215, 222–23
(2010).
177. Lisa A. Dolak, Beware the Inequitable Conduct Charge! (Why Practitioners Submit
What They Submit), 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 558, 564 (2009).
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to every examiner. But the logistical issues can be overcome, and prospectively,
there is little or no effect. By that, I mean that patent applications filed after the date
of the decision are essentially unaffected by the holding of McKesson.178 For
applications still pending at the time McKesson was issued, applicants could still
possibly disclose office actions from other similar applications.179 This is because
unlike the specification, which is essentially frozen as of the filing date,
prosecution is open until the issuance date.180 An applicant can always provide
additional disclosures, although the Patent Office may, depending on the timing
and circumstances, require an additional fee to be paid or require a continuation
application to be filed.181
The world is different for patents which were issued prior to McKesson. The
prosecution for those patents has already closed. Consequently, no new materials,
including office actions, can be disclosed to the Patent Office. If any of those
patents are asserted in litigation, a charge of inequitable conduct will immediately
be raised by the accused infringer. Depending upon the case, the McKesson defense
may be meritorious. Thus, these patents have suffered a loss in value.
More recently, the Federal Circuit made it more difficult for accused infringers
to prevail on the defense of inequitable conduct. In Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., the Federal Circuit ruled that, in order to satisfy the materiality
requirement of the inequitable conduct defense, the nondisclosed reference must be
“but-for” material.182 That means that the accused infringer must show that the
Patent Office would not have granted the patent if it had known of the nondisclosed
reference.183 Therasense will make it more difficult to successfully raise the
defense.184 This ruling may have retroactive effects on a subset of issued patents
that would have been unenforceable under the pre-Therasense standard, but are not
under the post-Therasense standard.
D. Retroactivity and Potential Competitors
Retroactivity affects more than just individual patentees. It also affects potential
infringers. For example, another change with respect to prosecution behavior may
have occurred near the time the Federal Circuit was created. After its creation, the
Federal Circuit adopted the law of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.185 In

178. Obviously, all patent applications now cost slightly more to prosecute because the
lawyers need to locate and disclose office actions in related cases.
179. The patent community has complained that the new burdens established by
McKesson are too difficult. See, e.g., Courtenay Brinckerhoff, Three Easy Solutions to the
McKesson Problem, PHARMAPATENTS BLOG (June 24, 2010), http://www
.pharmapatentsblog.com/duty-of-disclosure/three-easy-solutions-to-the-mckesson-problem/.
180. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006).
181. 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (2013).
182. 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
183. Id.
184. Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton Dickinson: A First
Impression, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 226, 251 (2012) (“[T]he majority opinion clearly
indicates the intent to make it more difficult to establish inequitable conduct.”).
185. John A. Morrissett, i 4 an i: Why Changing the Standard for Overcoming the
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1984, just two years after its creation, the Federal Circuit afforded issued patents a
heightened presumption of validity over all prior art, regardless of whether the art
had been submitted to the Patent Office.186
Arguably, this changed patent prosecution practice. Previously, in at least some
judicial circuits, if the applicant did not submit a prior art reference to the Patent
Office, there was a lower presumption of validity as to that art.187 Holders of issued
patents generally benefited from this change, as their patents were provided a
stronger presumption of validity than they anticipated when the patent applications
were filed and prosecuted. Another similar change was the Federal Circuit’s
elevation of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test for obviousness, adopting and
strengthening precedent from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.188 These
changes, however, may have been anticipated. In fact, Congress debated the Act
which created the Federal Circuit for many years.189 It was likely foreseeable that a
new national court with authority over patent appeals would be both slightly
pro-patentee and inclined to adopt the law of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals. These examples—the raising of the presumption of validity and the
ratcheting up of the test for obviousness—both differ from the other cases in that
they have substantial prospective effects. The point of these examples is to show
that accused infringers (not patentees) occasionally may be harmed by retroactive
effects of decisions.190
Furthermore, in industries that mainly rely upon cross-license arrangements of
huge patent pools, the effects of retroactivity may be muted.191 In these industries,
the exact contours of individual patents are less important than the quantity of
patents owned.192 Since the Federal Circuit decisions do not automatically reduce
the number of patents in a portfolio, they do not substantially change the
cross-licensing positions of the parties. In contrast, smaller companies and
individual inventors typically do not have a diversified patent portfolio. They are at
higher risk that Federal Circuit opinions materially impact their patent value.
Presumption of Patent Validity Will Cause More Harm Than Good, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH.,
no. 2, 2012, at 1, 11, http://jolt.richmond.edu/v18i2/article7.pdf.
186. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir.
1984), abrogated by Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
187. In fact, some circuits stated that no presumption of validity was owed to that art.
Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1980).
188. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had adopted a similar test in 1961. See
Application of Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–957 (C.C.P.A. 1961). The Federal Circuit’s
teaching-suggestion-motivation test became the focal point of the Supreme Court’s KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. opinion. 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007).
189. Scott Amy, Limiting the Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: How Holmes Alters the
Landscape of Patent Cases on Appeal, 38 GA. L. REV. 429, 436–37 (2003).
190. Arguably, raising the standards for proving obviousness did not have any retroactive
effect on infringers, assuming that the U.S. Patent Office properly applied the older, broader
standard. That is because the Patent Office should not have granted any patents unless they
met the broader standard, and patentees should not have been able to resurrect applications
rejected and abandoned under the broader standard.
191. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HAST. L.J. 297, 321–22 (2010).
192. Id. at 308 (noting that in large cross-licensing arrangements, “parties focused on the
quantity rather than the quality of patents in a portfolio”).
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Therefore, importantly, retroactivity may have disproportionately large effects on
smaller inventors.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
A. The Federal Circuit’s Consideration of Retroactivity
Retroactivity appears to be a noticeable trouble spot for the Federal Circuit. The
Federal Circuit is the central and the nearly exclusive decider of the patent laws.
Other bodies that create and modify the patent laws do not appear to have the same
blind spot. First, changes can be made through legislation, in addition to judicial
resolution of particular disputes. When Congress modifies the law, it hears views
from various places. In theory, multiple lobbyists from various constituents solicit
legislators and attempt to convince them to modify the laws in a particular
direction. Interested and knowledgeable parties are invited to provide testimony
before congressional committees. The media and citizens also play a role. This has
occurred, to an extent, in the debates about patent reform. Patent reform has been
proposed in Congress in each of the last five years and was finally passed in 2011
with the America Invents Act.193 The debate is framed as being between various
industries—typically the IT industry lobbying for weaker patents and the
pharmaceutical industry opposing the weakening.194 While this process is far from
perfect, the views of various actors are present.195 Moreover, Congress has a fair
amount of flexibility regarding the precise time period to which changes in law
apply.196 For instance, many of the provisions in the America Invents Act have
clear effective dates and are not retroactive.197 Furthermore, Patent Office rule
changes are de facto more likely to be prospective-only in application.198

193. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
194. Eric E. Williams, Patent Reform: The Pharmaceutical Industry Prescription for
Post-Grant Opposition and Remedies, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 354, 362
(2008).
195. The major international intellectual property treaty requires the patent laws of
signatory countries to have various provisions. However, it does not require these provisions
to have retroactive effects. For example, Article 70.3 states, “There shall be no obligation to
restore protection to subject matter which on the date of application of this Agreement for
the Member in question has fallen into the public domain.” Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 70.3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 329. Thus, the
treaty negotiators considered and rejected a requirement of retroactivity.
196. Arti K. Rai, Essay, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1265 (2012) (noting that Congress
is “typically free to act prospectively, retroactively, or both, depending on the nature of a
given problem”).
197. For instance, the definition of prior art with respect to sales has been expanded to
include sales that occurred entirely abroad. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(b),
125 Stat. at 285–86. This change became effective in March 2013. Id. § 3(n), 125 Stat. at
293.
198. Rai, supra note 196, at 1270.
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Separately, the Supreme Court hears patent cases and appears to be very in tune
with the effects of its rulings. As the Supreme Court typically hears only cases of
significant importance, it knows that parties beyond those in the dispute will be
affected. It also receives input from parties outside the litigation via the amicus
curiae brief process, so it hears the views of the community.199 For example, the
Supreme Court recently rejected a request to weaken the presumption of validity
afforded to issued patents in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership.200 In that case,
the Supreme Court received over forty amici briefs, representing a wide range of
industries.201 The Supreme Court is theoretically attuned to the potential retroactive
repercussions of its decisions, and its concern for retroactivity might play a
significant role in the Court’s analysis and ultimate decision in the case.
The Supreme Court also seems to know that in patent law, in particular, there
are important potential retroactive effects. In fact, the Justices frequently ask
questions that convey their concerns about effects on other industries. For instance,
in the KSR oral argument, Justice Souter appeared concerned about revising the
Federal Circuit’s test for evaluating whether an invention is obvious.202 He asked
counsel for the accused infringer:
Justice Souter: What do you make of the, sort of the revolution
argument that whether it’s contrary or intention with, in fact the, it’s
been applied in what is now the Fed Circuit for what, 20 years, more
than 20 years I guess. And to tip it over now is going to produce chaos.
What’s the answer to that?203
In the Bilski v. Kappos oral argument, the Justices seemed concerned about the
effects of an opinion on parties and industries outside the litigants. Justices
Ginsburg and Kennedy noted that the parties were concerned the Supreme Court
would make a bold change in the doctrine at issue—patentable subject matter—that
would affect industries outside the dispute itself.204 First, the Office of the Solicitor

199. See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach
Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395 (2011); David Orozco & James G.
Conley, Friends of the Court: Using Amicus Briefs to Identify Corporate Advocacy Positions
in Supreme Court Patent Litigation, 2011 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 107 (2011).
200. 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
201. Amici briefs were filed on behalf of parties such as 3M, Apple, Acushnet, Toyota,
IBM, Genentech, Facebook, Intel, General Motors, Cisco, Netflix, Teva Pharmaceuticals,
numerous law and business school academics, and various intellectual property bar
associations. Microsoft v. i4i Limited Partnership, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog
.com/case-files/cases/microsoft-v-i4i-limited-partnership/.
202. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19–20, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 3422210.
203. Id. at 20. The context of Justice Souter’s later questions made it clear that he was
concerned about the effect on issued patents of a change in the standard of patent
obviousness. He followed up on the above-quoted excerpt with a question about judicial
economy: If the Supreme Court changes the law, “are there going to be 100,000 cases filed
tomorrow morning?” Id. at 21.
204. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47–48, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No.
08-964), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-964.pdf.
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General stated to the Supreme Court that it opposed granting certiorari in the case
because two other industries, software and medical diagnostics, raised important
issues.205 Justice Kennedy responded by saying that the Deputy Solicitor General
“thought we’d mess it up.”206 Later, Justice Ginsburg noted that the case—
involving claims directed to a method of hedging risk—could be resolved “without
making any bold step.”207 The Court’s eventual ruling was short on details,
consistent with the assertion that the Court should tread lightly in patent law due to
concerns about retroactivity.
Other Supreme Court patent opinions also reveal that retroactivity concerns are
considered.208 An example is the Supreme Court’s important Festo opinion.209
There, the Supreme Court reviewed a decision from the Federal Circuit that had
created a hard and fast rule that had eliminated application of a theory of
infringement—known as the “doctrine of equivalents”—if the patentee had taken
certain actions during prosecution of the patent.210 Many complained about the
retroactive effects of the Federal Circuit’s opinion on issued patents because these
prosecution actions had not invoked an absolute bar when they were undertaken.211
In reversing the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court replaced the absolute bar with a
flexible standards-based test to determine when the doctrine of equivalents was
inapplicable.212 The Supreme Court’s flexible test relied in part upon
foreseeability.213 The foreseeability requirement attempted to soften the ruling by
exempting past behavior which had unforeseeable consequences.214 In other words,

205. Id. at 47.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 48.
208. It may also be that the Supreme Court’s view toward decision making is different
from the Federal Circuit’s. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J.
2, 75 (2010) (discussing the “methodological divergence of the formalistic Federal Circuit
and the holistic Supreme Court”).
209. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
210. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 569 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
211. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Harris, Festo Has Decimated the Doctrine of Equivalents, 65
TEX. B.J. 58, 59 (2002).
212. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740–41; J. Andrew Lowes & David L. McCombs, Off on a
Tangent: Using Festo’s Second Criterion to Rebut the Presumption of Surrender, 88 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 579 (2006).
213. The Supreme Court’s test created a presumption that the doctrine of equivalents was
inapplicable when the patent had been narrowed for reasons relating to patentability. The
presumption could be rebutted if the patentee could show that (1) the equivalent at issue was
unforeseeable at the time of the application, (2) the equivalent at issue was only tangentially
related to the reasons for the amendment, or (3) there was some other reason why the
patentee could not have drafted claims to literally cover the equivalent at issue. Festo, 535
U.S. at 740–41.
214. Subsequent Federal Circuit opinions have narrowly construed the flexibility
provided by the Supreme Court in Festo. Because of this, many believe that the Supreme
Court’s flexible bar test has been construed as almost an absolute bar. Accordingly, the
real-world effects of the decision may have had substantial retroactive effects. However, the
Supreme Court considered the possibility of them and attempted to address them.
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the Supreme Court apparently attempted to mitigate retroactive effects of its
opinion. Indeed, the majority opinion expressly acknowledged as much: “To
change so substantially the rules of the game now could very well subvert the
various balances the PTO sought to strike when issuing the numerous patents
which have not yet expired and which would be affected by our decision.”215 In
sum, the opinions and questioning by the Justices point in the same direction; they
both support the view that the Supreme Court considers retroactivity in making its
patent decisions.216
It is important to note that in some instances, the Supreme Court has recently
discounted the relevance of past Patent Office practice. In Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Supreme Court confronted whether isolated
DNA was patent eligible.217 In a unanimous opinion, the Court found that isolated
DNA was not patent eligible, despite the fact that the Patent Office had awarded such
patents for well over a decade.218 The Court noted that Congress had never endorsed
the views of the Patent Office in subsequent legislation.219 Thus, in the Myriad case,
the Supreme Court issued a ruling with profound retroactive effects, and one that
reversed longstanding practice by patent lawyers.
The executive branch also appears attuned to retroactive effects. The United
States, through the Department of Justice, participates in some judicial decisions as
an amicus filer. In Festo, the United States filed a brief as amicus curiae.220 That
brief acknowledged the “legitimate expectations” of fair patent scope.221 This
indicates that the executive branch considers the effects of decisions on existing
inventors.

215. Festo, 535 U.S. at 739 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6 (1997)).
216. In fact, one may argue that the Supreme Court is too concerned about retroactivity in
patent law. Its decision in Bilski v. Kappos has been roundly criticized because of its lack of
detail in critical aspects of the opinion. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Guest Post on Bilski:
Throwing Back the Gauntlet, PATENTLY-O (June 29, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent
/2010/06/guest-post-on-bilski-throwing-back-the-gauntlet.html (arguing that Bilski suffers
from a lack of clarity). There, the Supreme Court found Mr. Bilski and a co-inventor’s patent
application unpatentable because it was directed to an “abstract idea.” Bilski v. Kappos, 130
S. Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010). The Supreme Court offered scant guidance for why the claim was
an abstract idea and how to determine if other patent claims were directed to abstract ideas.
Perhaps its fear of disrupting the patent community through a broad ruling caused the
Supreme Court to be overly cautious. This is not to say that the Supreme Court perfectly
considers retroactivity in patent law. One could argue that various Supreme Court decisions
failed to adequately consider it, including Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383
U.S. 1 (1966), as well as Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
217. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
218. Id. at 2118.
219. Id.
220. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand, Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (No. 00-1543), 2001
WL 1025650.
221. Id. at 2.
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Similarly, when the Federal Circuit hears a case en banc, it is situated to
consider retroactive effects. En banc cases typically deal with important issues and
elicit numerous amici filings.222 Thus, like the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit
can consider retroactive effects and draft opinions to minimize these pernicious
effects.
These two mechanisms—Supreme Court review and Federal Circuit en banc
review—have two important similarities. First, the courts in these circumstances
recognize that the cases affect parties beyond those in the lawsuit. They recognize
that their rulings will affect other parties, who often will not be similarly situated to
the parties in the suit. They hopefully recognize that these effects include
retroactive effects for some parties. Second, these courts receive input from the
broader community. The amici process permits nonparties to share their views with
the courts. In patent cases, both en banc and at the Supreme Court, there has been a
plethora of amici filings.223 Consequently, at least in patent law, these views of the
industries and other parties (including academics) are provided and available to the
court.
B. Retroactivity in Other Areas of Law
The Supreme Court has a substantial body of law devoted to retroactivity of its
decisions. In the civil context, the modern Supreme Court’s doctrine regarding
retroactivity was established in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,224 where the Court
recast its existing case law to create a clear standard that would govern both
criminal and civil law.225 Chevron Oil dealt with whether a previous Court
decision—Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.226—which created a one-year
statute of limitations for personal injury actions, applied to an action that was
commenced before Rodrigue was decided.227 In Chevron Oil, the plaintiff was

222. One important exception is the Federal Circuit’s hearing of cases en banc on a sua
sponte basis without notice to the parties. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc, in part) (infringement of product-by-process claims); DSU
Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc, in part) (proof of inducing
infringement claims). These decisions are made without the benefit of the insights of the
community. Consequently, they are at heightened risk of unintended retroactive effects.
Also, the Federal Circuit decided the important Cybor case en banc without permitting
briefing by anyone other than the parties. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). In that case, after oral argument and before the decision, the
Federal Circuit provided notice that it would decide the issue of the standard of review of
claim construction de novo. Id. at 1451. In its order granting en banc review, it noted that no
additional briefs would be permitted. Order Granting En Banc Review, 122 F.3d 46, 47 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). Without hearing the views of the community, the benefit of en banc review was
substantially reduced.
223. See Chien, supra note 199, at 408 (finding about 1000 amicus filings from 1989
until 2009).
224. 404 U.S. 97 (1971), abrogated by Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86
(1993).
225. Id. at 106–107.
226. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
227. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 98–99.
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injured while working on an artificial island rig owned by Chevron Oil Co.228 The
injury occurred in December of 1965, but because it was not initially perceived to
be serious, the plaintiff did not bring action until January 1968.229 This case dealt
with the application of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.230 When the original
lawsuit was filed, the existing legal precedent indicated that admiralty law applied
to personal injury suits.231 However, during the pendency of the case, the Supreme
Court decided Rodrigue, which determined that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act did not make admiralty law applicable to personal injury actions.232 The issue,
then, was whether the Rodrigue decision would bar the plaintiff’s recovery.233
The Supreme Court in Chervon Oil held that it is appropriate to apply a decision
prospectively if three criteria are met: (1) the decision would establish a new
principle of law, by overruling past precedent on which the litigants may have
relied or by deciding an issue of first impression in a way not easily predictable,
(2) the retrospective operation of the rule in question would conflict with its
historical purpose and effect, and (3) inequity would be imposed by retroactive
application.234
Almost twenty years after Chevron Oil, the Supreme Court in 1991 outlawed the
doctrine of selective retroactivity in a splintered decision with five separate
opinions.235 That case concerned whether a previous Supreme Court case,236 which
declared a Hawaii excise tax on imported alcohol unconstitutional, should apply
retroactively to the state statute of another state. Prior to 1985, Georgia imposed an
excise tax on imported liquor that was double the tax imposed on liquor
manufactured within Georgia.237 The plaintiff sought a refund of taxes paid under
the Georgia law for 1982, 1983, and 1984.238 Specifically, this case addressed
selective prospectivity, which was adopted and later abandoned by the Supreme
Court in the criminal context.239 In James B. Beam Distilling Co., the Court held
that selective prospectivity breached the principle that litigants in similar situations
should be treated the same.240

228. Id. at 98.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 99.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 106–07. However, a rift soon began to develop between criminal and civil
nonretroactivity doctrine. In 1982, the Supreme Court created different standards of
nonretroactivity for criminal cases that were not final at the time the new decision was
issued, in contrast to those for which the conviction had been finalized. United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
235. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
236. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
237. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 529.
238. Id.
239. Selective prospectivity in criminal cases was adopted in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 297 (1967) and subsequently abandoned in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328
(1987).
240. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 537.
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The rejection of selective prospectivity was affirmed in Harper v. Virginia
Department of Taxation.241 Harper is another case seeking the refund of taxes
previously paid. The majority in Harper held that when the Court applies a rule of
federal law to the parties before it, every court must give retroactive effect to that
decision.242 In so holding, the Court explicitly extended Griffith’s ban against
“selective application of new rules.”243
Even though Harper is somewhat unclear regarding whether prospectivity in
general has been abolished for civil disputes, subsequent cases indicate that the
Court has treated it as doing so. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, characterized Harper as establishing a “firm rule of
retroactivity.”244 For now, the lower courts have simply been treating Harper as
standing for the proposition that if a court applies a new rule to the parties that are
before it, the rule must apply retroactively to all cases pending on direct review or
not final.245
Retroactivity in criminal law applies differently than in civil law. With its
heightened due process concerns, criminal law is quite distinguishable from patent
law. As such, case law in the criminal arena may not be completely applicable to
retroactivity in patent law.246

241. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 97. However, debate among the Justices continued. Justices O’Connor and
Rehnquist dissented on grounds that the Chevron Oil test should have been applied. Id. at
113. O’Connor’s dissent also notes, in a somewhat troubled manner, that the majority’s
analysis seems to invalidate pure prospectivity as well as selective prospectivity, particularly
with its references to a lack of constitutional authority to disregard current law. Id. at 115.
244. 511 U.S. 244, 279 n.32 (1994). Landgraf did not actually present a question
regarding adjudicative retroactivity. Rather, it deals with claims of employment
discrimination relating to sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Id. at 248.
245. See, e.g., McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994); State v. Hooper,
176 P.3d 911, 913 n.1 (Idaho 2007); State ex rel. Brown v. Bradley, 658 N.W.2d 427, 430
n.5 (Wis. 2003).
246. For completeness, a brief description of retroactivity in the criminal context is
provided as follows. While the general historical rule was that judicial decisions apply
retroactively, modern criminal retroactivity doctrine began to change this in the wake of a
series of decisions in the 1960s. The Warren Court had made a series of criminal procedure
decisions which threatened to invalidate a large number of convictions from prior years. The
Supreme Court first addressed the retroactivity issue in this context in its 1965 decision of
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). There the Court held that the Constitution neither
prohibited nor required an absolute rule of retroaction. Instead, the Court set forth a threepart test for whether a rule should be applied in a prospective fashion: the Court must look to
(1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) the reliance placed upon the old doctrine, and (3) the
effect that a retrospective application will have upon the administration of justice. Id. at 636.
However, this holding was limited to cases that were being collaterally reviewed. One year
later, in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), a case dealing with challenges
surrounding the adoption of the new Miranda rights standards, the Supreme Court expanded
the Linkletter holding to include those cases that come up on direct review.
The Supreme Court further restructured its criminal retroactivity jurisprudence in
1989 with Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). In a plurality opinion, the Court stated that,
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C. Academic Approaches to Retroactivity
Most scholarship addressing retroactivity in areas other than criminal law
approaches retroactivity in very general terms. A notable exception is a seminal
1997 article by Professor Jill Fisch.247 Fisch conducted an overview of both
adjudicative and legislative retroactivity, detailed issues which surround
retroactivity in general, and proposed a new equilibrium approach in considering
retroactivity problems.248 Fisch described several constitutional constraints on
adjudicative prospectivity, the most prominent of which are based on principles of
separation of powers and the nature of judicial power.249
Fisch argued that there are two countervailing policy considerations with respect
to judgment: efficiency and fairness.250 Fairness concerns are predicated upon

subject to two exceptions, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not applicable
to cases that become final before the new rules are announced. Id. at 307, 310. The two
exceptions are cases where the change in the law places “certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of criminal law-making authority to proscribe,” or
where the change is so fundamental that the new procedures are “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.” Id. at 307 (citations omitted). The Court defined a rule as “new” for
retroactivity purposes if it “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or
the Federal Government” or “if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. at 301 (emphasis in original).
Later cases compacted this analysis into one threshold condition and a three-part
test. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389–90 (1994). The threshold condition is
that the rule must be procedural rather than substantive. Id. at 390. Once this is established,
the Teague test requires three inquiries. First, the date upon which the petitioner’s conviction
became final must be determined. Id. Second, if the conviction became final prior to the rule,
one must consider whether the rule is “new” according to the meaning ascribed by the
Teague court. Id. Finally, the third question is does the new rule fall within the boundaries of
the two exceptions. Id.; Teague, 489 U.S. at 307.
Supreme Court cases since Teague have primarily focused upon clarifying aspects
of the test it set forth. In Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998), the Court
affirmed Teague’s application to procedural rules only, and held that its test cannot apply in
cases where a substantive change has been made, such as where the Supreme Court decides
the meaning of a criminal statute enacted by Congress. In Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S.
348, 353 (2004), the Supreme Court wrestled with a case brought about by a change in
Arizona’s capital murder statute, wherein the Court distinguished between a procedural
change in law, which shifted who would make a finding of fact, and a substantive matter,
such as a change in the “range of conduct or the class of persons the law punishes.” Finally,
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 308–09 (2008), addressed a point that Teague had left
unresolved by holding that states are allowed to give prisoners the retroactive benefit of
Supreme Court decisions even if the Court has ruled that they are not retroactive under
federal law. There is also a separate body of case law dealing with retroactivity under the Ex
Post Facto Clause. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003); Collins v. Youngblood,
497 U.S. 37, 54–55 (1990).
247. Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1055 (1997).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1076.
250. Id. at 1084.
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reliance interests and generally support prospective application of new rules.251
Efficiency arguments, on the other hand, tend to favor retroactive application of
new rules.252 Efficiency in this framework is defined as maximizing the benefits of
legal change.253 Retroactive application of improvements in the law can help
prevent windfalls and the creation of protected classes based upon opportunistic
avoidance of new legal rules.254
These concerns led Fisch to call for a new approach based upon equilibrium
theory.255 A stable equilibrium exists where the applicable legal rules are clear,
have been promulgated by a higher legal authority, have been settled for a period of
time, and have not been criticized or questioned by legal authorities.256 The theory
here is based around the idea that decisions should not be applied retroactively
where they disrupt a stable equilibrium.257 By allowing for a balance to be made
between the two competing interests of fairness and efficiency, courts using an
equilibrium theory of retroactivity would be able to conduct the kind of nuanced
analysis required in retroactivity jurisprudence without relying on arbitrary
criteria.258
Fisch’s framework has not been adopted by the courts. Other academics are
much less supportive of the existence of a prospectivity doctrine.259 There are other
articles on retroactivity, including on retroactivity in criminal law, which for
brevity reasons will not be discussed herein.260 There is very little academic work
addressing retroactivity in intellectual property law.261 In fact, only two articles

251. Id. at 1085.
252. Id. at 1088.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1089.
255. Id. at 1111.
256. Id. at 1103. This approach is an extension of William Eskridge and Philip Frickey’s
work regarding the equilibrium theory of legal change. Id. at 1100.
257. Id. at 1123.
258. Id. at 1103.
259. See, e.g., Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of
Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811 (2003).
260. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991). Articles on retroactivity in
criminal law include Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or
“Redressability,” after Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive
Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2009); see also Katharine A. Ferguson, The Clash of Ring v. Arizona
and Teague v. Lane: An Illustration of the Inapplicability of Modern Habeas Retroactivity
Jurisprudence in the Capital Sentencing Context, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1017 (2005).
261. Relatively little work has been done regarding retroactivity in copyright law, likely
because copyright eligibility is automatic, and as such is not disrupted by any changing
eligibility requirements. See J. Nicholas Bunch, Takings, Judicial Takings, and Patent Law,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1747, 1755–56 (2005). The primary concerns with retroactivity in copyright
law revolve around term extension of copyrights. See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and
Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 19 (2002). For example, in Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
Judge Sentelle argued in his dissent that retroactive application of copyright term extension
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about retroactivity in patent law could be located. In 2003, Professor Daniel R.
Cahoy published an article in which he constructed a framework for a modified
version of the retroactivity analysis laid out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.262 Unlike
this Article, Cahoy focused on a prominent Supreme Court decision, Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,263 and two en banc Federal Circuit
decisions, Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research
Foundation264 and Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service Co.265
Cahoy argued that these three decisions have had retroactive effects on patent
holders, which they surely did.266 Professor Cahoy’s version of retroactivity differs
from that presented in this Article for several reasons. First, he did not recognize
the lack of prospective effects of many Federal Circuit opinions. Second, he
focused on an entirely different type of opinion—a few significant Supreme Court
and en banc Federal Circuit cases.267
Cahoy argued that courts need to make a realistic assessment of when rules are
“new.”268 To do this, Cahoy urged full adoption of the equilibrium framework
which was laid out in the 1997 article by Fisch.269 Fisch recommended using the
stability of an area of law and the degree of reliance upon such stability to
determine whether a law is “new” for the purposes of retroactivity analysis.270 As
for the third factor of the Chevron analysis, Cahoy recommended that courts should
simply set out broad categories of decisions that suggest greater scrutiny in their
outcome.271 He advised this rules-based approach because it would be too time
consuming for the courts to independently analyze the facts of each case.272 Cahoy
advocated that the important second factor in the Chevron test be reduced.273 More
specifically, Cahoy argued that courts should only look to the second factor when
no clear answer is provided by the first and third factors.274 Cahoy argued that this
is optimal because a robust use of the second factor, which he characterized as an
avenue for the courts to give special weight to policy considerations, can encroach

violates the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. Ochoa, supra, at 119. Retrospective
increases in copyright term length bring about a very different set of concerns compared to
retroactive changes in patent law. These increases, if they effectuate a taking at all, can only
be said to be taking from the public domain. See R. Anthony Reese, Is the Public Domain
Permanent?: Congress’s Power to Grant Exclusive Rights in Unpublished Public Domain
Works, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 531 (2007).
262. Daniel R. Cahoy, Changing the Rules in the Middle of the Game: How the
Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions Related to Intellectual Property Can Promote
Economic Efficiency, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2003).
263. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
264. 429 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc order).
265. 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
266. Cahoy, supra note 262, at 46–47.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Fisch, supra note 247.
270. Id.
271. Cahoy, supra note 262, at 43.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 44.
274. Id. at 45.
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upon the legislative function.275 Cahoy argued that courts should instead attempt to
acknowledge that the legislature is more often the more appropriate venue to affect
future changes in the law.276
Cahoy analyzed the three decisions through the Fisch framework. He concluded
that Festo and Symbol Technologies277 should only be applied prospectively
because they changed the rules in a manner against the expectations of the patent
community.278 Cahoy asserted that Johnson & Johnston279 should be applied
retroactively because the prior precedent was based upon a single case.280 Because
he relied exclusively on Fisch’s framework, he did not consider whether the court
issued the ruling knowing of the retroactive effects the decision had.
Arti Rai briefly considered the issue of retroactivity in patent law.281 Professor
Rai emphasized the effects of judicial decisions in patent law on the investing
community.282 Eventually, Rai concludes that the Patent Office should have more
authority for policy issues in patent law than the courts.283
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROSPECTIVITY AND RETROACTIVITY PROBLEM
Finding solutions to the curious case of prospectivity and retroactivity in patent
law is difficult. Set forth below are several potential solutions including relying less
on precedential opinions, eliminating the practice of deciding cases en banc without
notice to the public, and writing narrower opinions. This Part also addresses two
other proposals, grandfather clauses and takings law, that would not be effective
solutions to the problem.
A. Limit the Use of Precedential Opinions
One important method of reducing retroactive effects is to reduce the use of
precedential opinions. While many people argue for more precedential opinions,284
such opinions increase the potential of retroactive effects. Within the hierarchy of
potential appellate resolutions—precedential opinion, nonprecedential opinion, and
summary affirmance—precedential opinions have the highest potential for negative
reactions by the community. The reason is obvious: in a common law system,
precedential opinions explain the law in detail. Precedential opinions are binding
not only on all of the district courts and the Patent Office, but they also bind other
Federal Circuit panels. Thus, any precedential opinion carries the potential for

275. Id. at 44.
276. Id.
277. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 277 F.3d 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
278. Cahoy, supra note 262, at 52–53, 58–59.
279. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
280. Cahoy, supra note 262, at 63–65.
281. Rai, supra note 196.
282. Id. at 1272.
283. Id. at 1281.
284. See, e.g., Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential
Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755 (2003).
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extreme effects. Nonprecedential opinions are not binding or authoritative. To be
sure, nonprecedential opinions may be persuasive and would have some effects on
issued patents. However, the effects are likely substantially more muted than those
from precedential opinions. And summary affirmances,285 in which the opinion of a
lower tribunal is affirmed without any written explanation of the rationale, have the
lowest possibility for retroactive effects. That is because summary affirmances
have little to no effect for parties outside those represented in the dispute on appeal.
Of the patent infringement cases the Federal Circuit decides on the merits, the
majority are decided via a precedential opinion.286 The use of fewer precedential
opinions will reduce the likelihood of opinions with retroactive effects.287 The
Federal Circuit should reserve the use of precedential opinions to those disputes for
which it considers and understands the potential retroactive effects. To be prudent,
the Federal Circuit should reduce the number of precedential opinions it issues.
To be fair, decreasing the number of precedential opinions has the potential to
make judges less accountable. The judges could be less attentive to their opinions,
as their effects would be small. Nonprecedential opinions also risk favoritism to
certain parties. Parties in factually similar situations may be treated differently
without precedent to bind a subsequent panel of the court. These costs of
nonprecedential opinions must be carefully weighed against the benefits.
B. Eliminate En Banc Review of Cases Without Notice to the Parties
The risk of inadvertent retroactive effects is heightened when the Federal Circuit
decides important cases without considering the views of parties outside of the
litigation. In recent years, the Federal Circuit has reviewed cases en banc without
providing prior notice to the community.288 In these cases, the Federal Circuit heard

285. Federal Circuit Rule 36 permits the Federal Circuit to affirm a decision of a lower
court without any written opinion. According to the rule, summary affirmances are limited to
situations when “an opinion would have no precedential value” and one of the following is
present:
(a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed from is
based on findings that are not clearly erroneous;
(b) the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict is sufficient;
(c) the record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or
judgment on the pleadings;
(d) the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance under
the standard of review in the statute authorizing the petition for review;
or
(e) a judgment or decision has been entered without an error of law.
286. During the 2010 court term, the Federal Circuit decided 220 patent appeals on the
merits. Of these, 59% were decided via a precedential opinion. It decided 22% via a
non-precedential opinion, and 19% via summary affirmance. Jason Rantanen, Federal
Circuit Dispositions, Part I, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 14, 2011), http://patentlyo.com/patent
/2011/02/federal-circuit-dispostions-part-i.html.
287. Another less conventional solution is to release precedential opinions in draft form.
The parties and patent community could be permitted a comment period before the opinion
became final.
288. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
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the matter en banc on its own initiative, sua sponte.289 More problematic, it did not
apprise the parties that it was considering the matter en banc. The parties briefed
the matter in the ordinary course, and argued it before a standard three-judge panel.
However, when the opinion was released, all of the active judges on the court had
considered an issue in the case.
Potential retroactive effects are heightened by neglecting to inform the public of
the en banc status of the case. Because other potentially affected companies or
industries are unaware of the court’s consideration of the issue, amici briefs are not
submitted. The academic community and bar associations, knowing nothing of the
en banc process, do not submit briefs. In these circumstances, the Federal Circuit is
most vulnerable to failing to adequately consider important interests.
Federal Circuit Judge Newman has criticized the use of sua sponte en banc
rulings. In a dissent in Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, she objected to the Federal
Circuit considering the case en banc “without notice and without argument and
without an opportunity for participation.”290 She argued that “the court has deprived
itself of input concerning the experience of precedent, of advice as to how this change
of law may affect future innovation, and of guidance as to the effect on existing
property rights.”291
These en banc rulings by definition are important; they typically overrule prior
conflicting precedent. En banc rulings are the only way that the Federal Circuit has to
expressly change the law. And, of course, they are precedential and bind all district
and appellate courts, as well as the Patent Office. They occur relatively infrequently,
especially compared to panel decisions. While these cases are few in number, the
practice of hearing a case en banc without notice to the public should be eliminated.
C. Seriously Consider Retroactive Effects
The best antidote to the problem of retroactivity in patent law is for the Federal
Circuit to fully and thoroughly consider the effects of its rulings on nonparties. This
proposal is a modest one. Indeed, the courts in all areas of law and at all levels
should always consider the potential effects of their rulings. Because retroactivity is
a large problem in patent law in particular, the Federal Circuit should have
heightened awareness when deciding cases.
Fully considering the effects of retroactivity does not necessarily mean that the
Federal Circuit must alter who wins cases. Quite the contrary, the court can issue
the same ultimate holdings. Opinions can be affirmed, reversed, or remanded as the
judges prefer. However, the opinions themselves must be more carefully crafted.
(en banc, in part) (discussing infringement of product-by-process claims); DSU Med. Corp.
v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc, in part) (discussing proof of
inducing infringement claims); Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863
F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc, in part).
289. Judge Rader recently offered a defense of the use of sua sponte en banc rulings
without notice. He stated that these cases are in “areas where the Court has reached a degree
of unanimity in its thinking, and we understand that before we sua sponte articulate that.”
Edward D. Manzo, Interview with Chief Judge Rader, IP LITIGATOR, July–Aug. 2010, at 10,
11.
290. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1302 (Newman, J., dissenting).
291. Id.
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Extraneous statements that serve little point in an opinion, other than perhaps to
bolster an already supported argument, should be omitted.292 This is particularly the
case when the extraneous statement may have unknown and potentially serious
effects on issued patents. In other words, the Federal Circuit should exercise
judicial minimalism more frequently. It should issue its opinions and focus only on
the most important facts and laws supporting its opinions.
D. Grandfathering of Issued Patents and Pending Applications
Another potential solution is to presumptively exempt issued patents and pending
applications from legal rulings. Unless the Federal Circuit expressly stated in an
opinion that it was intended to have retroactive effects, issued patents and pending
applications would be saved from its reach. Because this is not the practice in other
areas of law, it does not seem advisable to attempt with patent law. Perhaps a
framework such as that proposed by Fisch293 would be workable. Such an approach
would force the Federal Circuit to thoroughly consider potential retroactive effects of
its rulings.
Furthermore, the law could provide a limited right to amend issued patents and
pending applications within a short time period after certain Federal Circuit decisions.
This right to amend could permit patentees to avoid unpredictable changes to the
values of their patents. However, the potential for abuse is rife. Permission to amend
patents postissuance may result in unfair advantage by patentees. It could also result
in selective retroactivity, whereby the opinion was only retroactive to certain parties.
Consequently, such a proposal is likely unworkable in patent law.
E. Takings Law
Several academics have suggested that takings doctrine is appropriate in patent
law.294 Following this logic, takings law could solve any problem created by
retroactive Federal Circuit opinions.295 In my opinion, a remedy under the current
Federal Circuit theory of the takings laws would be inappropriate. While others
may disagree, it is not clear that takings law would fairly and properly solve the
problem with retroactivity. For the sake of completeness, takings law and theory
are briefly discussed below.
Professor Adam Mossoff argues that the Federal Circuit’s Zoltek Corp. v. United
States296 decision was incorrect in holding that patents are not secured by the
Takings Clause.297 Mossoff argues that the decision is wrong in view of several

292. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 3–6 (1999).
293. Fisch, supra note 247.
294. E.g., Bunch, supra note 261, at 1755–56 (arguing that takings law should apply to
judicial decisions that substantially depart from settled precedent in patent law because
patents are property).
295. Id.; Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007).
296. 442 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
297. Mossoff, supra note 295.
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Supreme Court rulings on the issue.298 Mossoff, while acknowledging that the
history of the takings doctrine is not crystal clear, asserts that patent rights should
be treated as constitutional private property.299 The Supreme Court, as Mossoff
notes, has recently reaffirmed that the nineteenth century Supreme Court precedent
treated patent rights as “legitimate expectations of inventors in their property.”300
Therefore, he argues that certain government actions may constitute a compensable
taking of a patent.301 Applying his argument to judicial decisions, one may argue
that certain Federal Circuit rulings amount to a taking. However, given the holding
of Zoltek, and the fact that Zoltek was a sovereign immunity case,302 current Federal
Circuit law does not support such a position.
Along similar lines, the Supreme Court considered whether to permit removal of
information from the public domain in the copyright context.303 Admittedly, patent
cases do not involve the same First Amendment concerns potentially attendant in
copyright cases. Retroactivity in patent law also involves altering private rights (of
patentees and potential infringers). But these rights are similar to rights of the
public in the public domain.304
CONCLUSION
Judicial decisions in any area of law may have retroactive applications. Patent law
decisions, in particular, are exceptionally likely to have such applications. This is
because patents last for a relatively long time, which increases the risk that judicial
decisions arise that affect their value. Patents are effectively unamendable, so they
cannot be adapted to reflect revisions to the law. Interestingly, most patent decisions
have almost no noticeable prospective effect. The linguistic flexibility in the patenting
process permits attorneys and inventors to prospectively avoid the holding of most
decisions. Thus, the full brunt of Federal Circuit decisions is felt by existing patentees.
The decisions change the rules for existing patents (and often pending applications
as well). It is easier to identify the problem than to solve it. Solutions to this problem
are difficult. They include reduced reliance upon precedential opinions and elimination
of deciding cases en banc without notice to the parties. Further consideration of this
problem is warranted.

298. Id. at 694.
299. Id. at 694–95.
300. Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 1010
(2007) (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739
(2002)).
301. See id. at 1009–11.
302. 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
303. In Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), the Supreme Court considered the
following question: Does the Progress Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8, prohibit Congress from taking works out of the public domain?
304. Recently, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the copyright laws. Golan, 132
S. Ct. at 894. The Supreme Court, after considering an international treaty, found that
retroactive application of the law was warranted because such decisions are within the
authority of the political branches and not the courts. Id. at 884–87.

